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THE IRRESISTIBLE FORCE OF SELF-DETERMINATION MEETS
THE IMPREGNABLE FORTRESS OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY: A
CAUTIONARY FAIRY TALE ABOUT CLASHES IN Kosovo AND
ELSEWHERE'
Paul C. Szasz"

Once upon a time, in a faraway world in which international law still
mattered-remember this is just a fairy tale and that I am speaking of a very
distant world-there was:
1. A force that many considered irresistible, called SelfDetermination;and there was
2. A fortress that was advertised as impregnable, called
the TerritorialIntegrity of States;
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and these two fought many a brave battle for predominance; also participating
in this conflict was:
3. A mischievous troll called the Uti Possidetis
Principle-whose full name: "uti possidetis, ita
possidetis,"roughly translates as "[you may] keep what
you had" 2-who sometimes reinforced Self-Determination by helping to put firm boundaries around newly
created countries which could then claim Territorial
Integrity, and sometimes reinforced the Territorial
Integrity of States by hardening boundaries against the
claims of Self-Determination; further there was
4. An evil wizard called Violence who was trying to attain
international status and meanwhile sowed confusion
among the other actors. When provoked he could
become a giant whom no one could withstand; when
allied with Self-Determination he was often called
Terrorism, and when allied with the Territorial Integrity of States he was sometimes called State-Terrorism;
and, finally, as in any good fairy tale, there was
5. A white knight called InternationalLaw, who fought
the wizard Violence, sometimes successfully, though
rarely so when the wizard turned into a giant.
The present tale is about the interaction of all these actors and about their
shifting alliances and conflicts in that faraway world. Each of them has a
lengthy but somewhat checkered history:
Violence is the oldest, originating in the Ur-chaos before law emerged.
The TerritorialIntegrity of States is probably next in seniority, deriving
from strivings for stability. It is recognized in UN Charter article 2(4), which
upholds the Territorial Integrity of States against external military attacks, but
not necessarily against subversion by Self-Determination.

2 See Rein Mllerson, Law and Politics in Succession of States: International Law on
Succession to Borders and the Uti Possidetis Principle, in
Succession of States, part III,
DISSOLUTION, CONTINUATION AND SUCCESSION IN EASTERN EUROPE 19-21 (Brigitte Stem ed.,
1998).
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InternationalLaw was born some 350 years ago in Westphalia at the end
of the Thirty Years War. Since then it has developed greatly and especially in
the past half century has enjoyed a healthy adolescent growth spurt.
Self-Determination3 itself entered the stage at the end of the 18th century
with the American and French Revolutions, one against external oppression
and the other against internal. The Vienna Conference ending the Napoleonic
wars sought to contain it, but in the 19th century it nevertheless manifested
itself in the Balkans with the liberation of Greece, Serbia and Montenegro
from the faltering Ottoman Empire, and in the decolonization of Latin
America. During World War I both Lenin and Wilson proclaimed it-from
different perspectives4 -but at the Paris Peace Conference it received only lip
service as the Allied and Associated Powers re-arranged the map of Central
Europe and the Balkans to suit their own mis-perceived interests. After World
War II, Self-Determination was proclaimed in Articles 1(2) and 55 of the UN
Charter-though not in the Chapters relating to non-self-governing or trust
territories. Nevertheless, it became the intellectual engine of decolonization,
a process now essentially completed. Most recently Self-Determination
received a new lease on life-though subject to some constraints that I will
mention-with the break-up of some of the post-WWI constructs: Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union peacefully, and Yugoslavia violently.
Finally, the Uti PossidetisPrinciple apparently came into being with the
decolonization of Latin America and later was observed in that of Africa.
More recently it was cited as an apparent stand-in for the Territorial Integrity
of States-as a justification for not allowing Croatia and Bosnia to be divided
along ethnic lines, after these two new states had themselves been allowed to
split off from Yugoslavia. 5
So, who is stronger: Self-Determination or the Territorial Integrity of
States? And on whose side is International Law? In the past half century their
battle has been carried out both in abstract legal instruments and in those
relating to specific conflicts:
As already mentioned, both principles are recognized in the UN Charter,
but quite non-confrontationally.

' The literature on Self-Determination is enormous. Some recent books include: MODERN
LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION (Christian Tomuschat ed.); ANTONIO CASSESE, SELFDETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL (1995); THOMAS D. MUSGRAVE, SELF-

DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES (1997).
4 See CASSESE, supra note 4, at 14-23.

' See Opinion No. 2, dated Jan. 1I, 1992, of the Arbitration Commission of the EC
Conference on Yugoslavia (the "Badinter Commission"), reprintedin 31 I.L.M., 1488, 1497-99
(1992).
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The two 1966 Human Rights Covenants refer only to Self-Determination; 6
they were adopted at the height of decolonization and these references helped
to reinforce that process. But decolonization raised few if any issues of the
Territorial Integrity of States, because most colonies were far from their
metropolitan countries. The claims of France that Algeria, and ofPortugal that
Angola and Mozambique, were integral parts of their territories, were in effect
laughed out of court.
Interestingly enough, the famous Decolonization Resolution of the UN
General Assembly7 was a harbinger of the future: after boldly proclaiming in
paragraph 2 that "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination," it
cautioned in paragraph 6 that "[a]ny attempt aimed at the ... disruption of the
national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." Maybe a close
call, but that important round appears to have gone to Territorial Integrity.
Recently, however, the conflict has become more one-sided. The August
1992 London Conference-which also established the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia-in its "Statement of Principles," after
fleetingly mentioning "the promotion of tolerance and the right to self
determination," speaks strongly of "the fundamental obligation to respect the
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the region;
and to respect the inviolability of all frontiers ...Rejection of all efforts to.
.change borders by force."' Thus the Conference was launched, largely to
resolve the Bosnian conflict, with its feet hobbled by the absolute requirement
to preserve the Territorial Integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The July 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in
concluding its definition of "War Crimes," affirms that "[n]othing [in the part
of the definition dealing with civil wars] shall affect the responsibility of a
Government... to defend the unity and territorial integrity of the State .... 9
6 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
17 1, art. 1.
1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1.
1. Both state: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development." This provision was included in the Covenants by specific direction
of the General Assembly in A/RES/545 (VI) of Feb. 5, 1952.
7 A/RES/1514 of Dec. 14, 1960.
8 See The London Conference Document LC/C2 (FINAL) of Aug. 26, 1992,
v, viii,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1533-34 (1992).
" Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, at art. 8(3), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), reproduced in 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998) and, in a corrected version, in
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/INF/3.
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Just a year ago, last December, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
on "Maintenance of international security-prevention of the violent
disintegration of States," in which Self-Determination is no longer even
mentioned. '
The situation in Kosovo is most illustrative. After months of Serb
atrocities against the Albanian Kosovars," culminating in the current
campaign to expel all of them from the province, the NATO allies are still
defining the goal of their massive bombing as just the restoration of the pre1989 autonomy ofKosovo within Serbia, and resisting-albeit now somewhat
less forcefully-the call for complete independence. 2
It is not difficult to see why that should be so. International Law is largely
made and practiced by states, that is by governments, and each government is
bent on at least protecting its own Territorial Integrity. And here it should be
recognized that many states have either ethnic or other faultlines that make
them vulnerable to the threat of Self-Determination. Just think of Canada and
Quebec; of Spain and the Basques and the Andelusians; France and Corsica;
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales; Belgium divided
between the Walloons and the Flamands; Sri Lanka and its Tamils; Nigeria
and the Ibos; Russia with Chechna and a score of other restless peoples and
provinces; not to speak of the Kurds and their several unhappy hosts.

A/RES/53/71 of Dec. 4, 1998.
Soon after the conflict took a bloody turn the Security Council adopted resolution 1160
of Mar. 31, 1998, paragraph 5 of which starts: "The Security Council,... Agrees, without
prejudging the outcome of the dialogue, with the proposal in the Contact Group statements of
9 and 25 March 1998 [S/1998/223 and /272] that the principles for the solution of the Kosovo
problem should be based on the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia..."
2 The remarks reproduced in the text were of course made early in the NATO bombing
campaign. About a month later, on May 8, the G-8 Foreign Ministers (the G-7 plus Russia)
agreed on a Statement, which inter alia called for "[a] political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government
for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region
.... " This statement is reproduced in annex I to S/RES/1244 of June 10, 1999. When a month
later Milosevic had been persuaded to accept the terms set out in the G-8 Statement, the Security
Council adopted the above-cited resolution, to which it annexed the Statement, and which inter
aliareaffirmed "the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the
Helsinki Final Act and annex 2," id. at 2, and authorized the UN Secretary-General "to establish
an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for
Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia." Id. at annex 2.
10
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So, when the Territorial Integrity of a State is threatened anywhere in the
world, other countries instinctively come to its defense. This is what has
happened in respect of Cyprus, which has been effectively divided between a
Northern (Turkish) sector and a Southern (Greek) one since 1974, when both
sectors were ethnically cleansed; it is clear that the twenty percent Turks will
not live in a state with a massive Greek majority, but nevertheless the
international community is insisting there can be only one Cyprus--even if the
United Nations must patrol the boundary between the two sectors
indefinitely. 3 As already recalled, at the 1992 London Conference it was
decided that Bosnia must remain a single state, even though about half the
population, that is the Serbs and the Croats, did not want to live in a single
state either with each other or with the Muslims; now the Dayton "peace" is
secured by a substantial NATO force, which on the one hand is quite unable
to accomplish the return of refugees and on the other will have to stay
indefinitely lest the civil war resume promptly-all this to preserve a purely
proforma Territorial Integrity. And now, in Kosovo, the world community is
again insisting that after all that has happened that province must remain part
of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, even at the cost of a massive, long-term
NATO occupation. When will we ever learn?
The trouble is, that all these solutions underestimate the wizard Violence,
hoping against hope that he (or should it be she) can either be soothed or
scared off by stem posturing. There are of course situations when Violence,
in the form of Terrorism, can be contained without requiring the government
seeking to preserve Territorial Integrity to resort to an unacceptable level of
State Terrorism. Think of the British and Northern Ireland-though there it
was touch and go; similarly in Spain with the Basques. In respect of Chechna,
on the other hand, Violence in effect won; the solution has been de facto
independence and thus a breach of Territorial Integrity in favor of SelfDetermination14, though the dejure situation remains unchanged.
Let me now advance a proposition-which may be unpopular because it
appears to legitimize Violence, or rather it openly assigns it a rdle in
determining the conflict between Self-Determination and Territorial Integrity.

3 This is the task of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),
established in 1964. The Force is described in chapter 9 of THE BLuEHELMETS: A REVIEW OF
UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING (3rd ed. 1996).
14 As of the final editing of this essay (end-December 1999),
Russia is engaged in a full
assault on Chechna, which may well succeed in restoring the province to central control.
Although ostensibly taken in response to continuing Terrorism within or originating in Chechna,
the military violence is such that it has been widely criticized as constituting, in effect, StateTerrorism, which may in turn reduce the legitimacy of Russia's occupation.
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My proposition is that when Terrorism becomes so strong that it can no longer
be suppressed without an unacceptable level of State-Terrorism, then the state
concerned has, either as a victim of Violence or as its perpetrator, lost the
legitimacy that enables it to insist on its Territorial Integrity. Sometimes a
State can avoid that fate by countering Terrorism not only by its own Violence,
but also by other measures that deprive the terrorists of support and ultimately
of legitimacy. In other words, Violence must be given its due, either by
skillfully turning it aside or by formally yielding to it; it cannot just be
disregarded because it is, almost by definition, not legitimate.
Let us now look at some alternative courses of action for the international
community in situations where ethnic or other conflicts lead to Violence
within a state:
1. The international community can refuse to intervene,
even if a country is unable to control domestic Violence; if horrible massacres result, just shut off CNN,
and close borders to the entry of refugees. But, in
practice, these measures cannot be taken, as we learned
in Rwanda and now again in Kosovo.
2. The world community can also assist in suppressing
Self-Determination in favor of Territorial Integrity-the course it is at present inclined to take. In
Bosnia we see the results of that strategy: an indefinite,
massive occupation, which still does not succeed in
really reunifying the country and cannot help the
displaced half of its population to return to their
original homes. All of NATO's forces and all of
NATO's men really can't put Yugoslavia/Kosovo
together again!
3. Finally, the international community can tip the scale
in favor of Self-Determination and against unconditional Territorial Integrity; if thereby new states are
created it will, at the most, have to patrol their new
mutual border-a much easier task than an occupation.
As to the economic viability of such state fragments, this should matter less
and less in a more and more integrated region or world.
So, there it is. A pragmatic solution that may not be entirely morally
pleasing, because it assigns such an important role to Violence in determining
the outcome. And thus we see that this is not really a fairy tale. For in a fairy
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tale evil wizards are always defeated and destroyed, and the principal
protagonists live together happily ever after. But the real world is not like that.
It is an imperfect world in which unsatisfactory compromises must be made
and ideals cannot always be maintained in their pristine purity. Nevertheless,
knights must sally forth to right what wrongs they can and to protect the
powerless as far as possible. And in doing so, they may find International Law
as a useful ally, by no means invincible but hopefully steadily growing
stronger.
These thoughts reflect my personal experiences during the past decade: first
in participating in the successful liberation and attainment of independence of
Namibia; then in a long, fruitless attempt to negotiate a constitution for Bosnia
that would square the circle of creating a democratic state which a majority of
its citizens do not want; and finally in trying to formulate a new constitution
for Cyprus in that the conundrum was essentially the same: how to create a
functioning and democratic state, no matter how decentralized, that fully and
permanently protects a suspicious minority against a large and unsympathetic
majority. In these assignments I have learned both the limitations of
international law and the satisfaction of pursuing it.

